INTRODUCTION
"Development" is inherently both an under-and overdeveloped idea. 1 Thus, the framing skills of regulatory entrepreneurs are of critical significance in linking it to intellectual property within the interplay of global governance structures, agents and their mediating institutions. 2 A governance paradigm supplements and even substitutes for the binary "command and control" or decentralized alternatives that have dominated the literature of regulation. 3 Defined recently as "organized efforts to manage the course of events in a social system," 4 among the chief characteristics of newer governance approaches are the kinds of agents involved, including private-public partnerships and/or non-state actors including civil society. 5 The increasing roles of these actors in a nodal 6 or networked 7 regulatory framework can encourage, among other things, greater collaboration, competition, and/or diversity, as they work with traditional state actors. 8 Another relative innovation of global governance theory is the heightened awareness of the techniques or technologies of governance, specifically, the differing degrees of normativity characterizing the norms used to govern. 9 Governance scholars invoke the term "soft law," for instance, which international law scholars use to denote something (there is some dispute over exactly what) less binding and enforceable than positive treaty law 10 -nonetheless something to which attention needs to be paid, for often these nimbler expressions of normativity eventually make their way into the overall regulatory matrix along a spectrum, rather than a binary between soft (often ignored) and hard (often over-emphasized). Conversely, when it pays attention to intellectual property, global governance literature so far has approached it either as an occasion for celebration, especially in the context of digital technologies, 11 or dirge, particularly when discussing the asymmetrical bargain driven in large part by private actors in catalyzing the WTO TRIPS agreement. 12 This Article attempts to trace further the liminal zone between soft and hard law, by describing how development is being effectuated through softer global intellectual property governance mechanisms such as recommendations promulgated within the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). In doing so, it links the governance analysis to its pluralism antecedents. 13 Legal 11 Lobel, supra note 3, at 432 . 12 See, e.g., Burris et al., supra note 4, at 26. 13 Margaret Chon, A Rough Guide to Global Legal Pluralism, in WORKING WITHIN scholarship in the domain of international law generally lacks the analysis of "power relations among legal spheres, the extent to which any legal sphere expresses local normative standards, and social interactions among spheres."
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The international intellectual property literature in particular has not explored alternative norm agents such as non-state actors or alternative norms such as soft law as precisely as it has explored the inter-regime challenges posed by the encounters between intellectual property and public health or human rights through the rubric of regime-shifting. 15 This is an attempt to move the scholarly conversation forward.
The recent "sources of law" approach by Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss evokes norm-setting and norm interpretation within a newer governance paradigm as applied to the TRIPS context. 16 Weaving back and forth between formal, hard law such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body's (DSB) decisions and informal soft law norms such as "Reports of Standing Committees, Model Law, or the advice given by WIPO technical advisors to WTO members," 17 they taxonomize the possible universe of norms available to the DSB in addition to the treaty text; they also caution that not all norms are equal or equally transparent. 18 Most references to soft law in the The narratives within emerging global governance models draw from various theoretical strands: a sociolegal focus on agents and social process, a critical legal focus on structural privileges, as well as a traditional international relations focus on state power. Decentralized or distributed global governance models have recently emerged in the context of sustainable forestry management, for example, in which various non-state actors such as public interest NGOs or trade associations set private standards ultimately adopted by public agencies. 20 At their most triumphal, these narratives of multi-stakeholder governance systems "are best understood as compound accountability systems, resting on . . . open and transparent decisional procedures, and dynamic competition among certification programs for business and public acceptance." 21 Other accounts of global governance as applied to international intellectual property focus on the Internet as an innovative regulatory host for non-state-based governance, including institutions such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) 22 or private intermediaries with jurisdiction over socalled user-generated content, where norms of creators and these corporate intermediaries connect and sometimes clash. 23 Similarly, some sociolegal scholars have articulated nodal governance theory, which describes sites "where knowledge, capacity and resources are mobilized to manage a course of events," 24 and where ensuing norms can be set by private actors, whether motivated by public or private interests. These alternative models of governance share an emphasis on decentralized approaches to regulation, often driven by non-state actors (or regulatory entrepreneurs) through soft law. Indeed, norms may even be generated through information gathering or other social practices 25 and not by the coercive power of legal rules. Some emerging global governance models share a common focus on power relations among actors within a systems perspective. The concept of regime-shifting, imported from the international relations literature, describes the inter-regime aspects of global intellectual property, 26 where both powerful and less powerful state actors can and do shift venuesor forum-shop -among different, coexisting regulatory, mostly public law, regimes. Other scholars have produced detailed case studies of private interests driving public law in international intellectual property regimes, resulting in asymmetric public law norms such as TRIPS. 27 These less sunny accounts have typically focused on the primary role of private industry association actors rather than public interest NGOs. They caution that powerful state actors in global governance structures within a regime complex such as international intellectual property may continue to press their advantage, echoing international law scholars such as Eyal Benvenisti and George Downes who worry about the problems of fragmented versus integrated international regimes. 28 These various global governance models and narratives are nonetheless still partial. They are evolving from the traditional preferences within the 24 intellectual property literature for analysis based on sovereign actors, public law and the innovation and economic growth paradigms. Among other things, what is missing is more consistent attention to alternative agents and norms (or the various interfaces between these and "law on the books") as they pertain to global public goods besides knowledge.
In the remainder of this Article, I attempt to expand on our current partial understanding of global intellectual property governance. In Part I of the Article, I briefly discuss the effort to promote global development, which has been not fully connected to intellectual property despite textual support within soft and hard law documents to do so. In Part II, I focus on the possible construction of global intellectual property governance, taking the WIPO Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (WIPO CDIP) as a case study. In Part III, I reverse this process and deconstruct or assess this particular governance effort, in light of the question that Talia Fisher has asked with respect to these newer models generally: That it "is not only one of decentralization versus centralization of the law, but, also the end of the day, will experience more substantive equality, 33 will depend on "structured agency" 34 : how relevant agents engage with intellectual property governance structures through various global institutions. It will also depend quite a bit on their abilities to frame such key terms as "development" via both hard and soft law. In addition to potential problems of fragmentation and policy incoherence, other issues lurk, including possibly missing components of due process of soft law. 38 creates a policy space for the integration of public interest concerns with the economic interests of intellectual property rights-holders. 39 And, an agreement between the United Nations and WIPO also refers to the latter being a specialized agency [within the UN] and as being responsible for taking appropriate action in accordance with its basic instrument, treaties and agreements administered by it, inter alia, for promoting creative intellectual activity and for facilitating the transfer of technology related to industrial property to the developing countries in order to accelerate economic, social and cultural development. 40 Yet with the exception of economic development, the various concepts in the sustainable or human development penumbras have not consistently affected the innovation mandate of intellectual property. 41 The Copenhagen Declaration's invocation of social justice and transparent governance, which growing volume of real income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different levels of development.") (emphases added). 38 involve distributional choices, due process and equality norms, is often missing in the intellectual property policy discourse. As the production of knowledge goods is linked to other global public goods, "[t]he equitable provision of global public goods can be viewed as part of the challenge of achieving global equity -an allencompassing public good."
I. DEVELOPMENT AND
42 Even if promoting creation and innovation is the premier value of intellectual property, the rights-maximizing agenda pursued by intellectual property-exporting states has resulted not only in power asymmetry but arguably in policies that are not welfare-maximizing even for domestic industries within those states. 43 Access for the purpose of follow-on innovation -in other words, for maximizing returns on the public good of knowledge itself -is a critical policy component within the overall intellectual property regulatory framework. 44 Moreover, access to knowledge for purposes of maximizing other global public goods such as basic education, food security and disease control implicates both fairness and growth. 45 At the same time that many have been observing decentralizing impulses within intellectual property, especially when intellectual property intersects with newer domains such as public health and human rights, 46 sociolegal scholars have articulated that international law generally is undergoing a pluralistic impetus. 47 The next Section examines some of these directions in global intellectual property governance.
B. Intellectual Property
In this Section, I sketch a few basic ways in which global intellectual property governance can operate, by way of new actors (such as non-statebased norm entrepreneurs), directions (of norm-setting and interpretation, 45 Chon, supra note 33, at 2885-86. 46 Helfer, supra note 10. 47 especially through soft law) and domains (of intellectual property goals other than innovation and creativity). 48 A caveat: this is not intended to be a post-Westphalian thought experiment. States can and do propose innovative norms, and may work together with other states in fleshing out norms. State actors may implement hybrid hard-soft law best practices that other states might want to emulate. 49 And of course, states may excel in diplomacy and in coordinating multilateral negotiations in which intersectional norms are discussed and compromises reached. At the end of the day, accountability for overall social welfare resides with states or some other arguably representative form of governance.
The most classic form of intellectual property governance is nationallevel public ordering in which, at least in the U.S., industries (nonstate actors) vie for negotiated compromises within a legal framework monopolized by the state. 50 Within this traditionally and territorially bounded domestic frame, the traditional policy balance weighs the temporary exclusive rights to induce innovation against access by different non-rights-holders for different purposes, including user-based innovation. 51 In copyright, for example, this balance is famously encapsulated by the section 107 fair use exception to the section 106 rights, which are the basic bundle of exclusive rights in U.S. copyright law. 52 Fair use is thought to promote goals such as follow-on innovation, as well as to facilitate education, scholarship and scientific research. 53 All of these access-facilitated activities promote more, and arguably better, innovation both directly and indirectly.
A slightly more pluralistic but still typical model of intellectual property policy-balancing occurs when intellectual property encounters other legal domains, still within a domestic realm. For example, normative consistency may be disrupted when there is a conflict between copyright protection, 48 Chon, supra note 13; Berman, A Pluralist Approach, supra note 47, at 308 ("[W]e need to focus on how norms articulated by a wide variety of communities end up having important impact in actual practice, regardless of the degree of coercive power those communities wield."). 49 Reichman, supra note 43, at 112 (introducing the concept of counter-harmonization). 50 on the one hand, and First Amendment-protected free speech, on the other. The norms of free speech, marked by a commitment to political liberty, do not overlap perfectly with the norms of copyright, committed as it often is to the end of economic instrumentalism and the goals of fostering creativity, innovation and the furtherance of knowledge. These pluralistic political and economic commitments are roughly mediated by fair use, still interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court within the traditional boundaries of intellectual property. In this domestic version of intellectual property pluralism, the normative conflict may be just as contentious as in the global field, and non-state actors (such as industry associations or consumer representatives) may be quite active. Yet because the epistemic and interpretative communities are relatively more connected with a shared domestic constitutional framework and values, incommensurability is treated less frequently as a problem of territorial or disciplinary xenophobia. Other national copyright norms may implicate differing local values of personality, privacy or performance. 54 The spectrum of possible norm proposals is vast once one concedes that intellectual property has some claim on the domains of global trade and development, or vice versa. 55 Some commentators have inferred from the reference to sustainable development in the preamble of the WTO, as well as to "socioeconomic and technological development" in Article 8 of TRIPS a mandate for "trade-plus" values, expressed within human rights norms or human development goals. 56 States Trade Representative (USTR) are increasingly driving intellectual property policy, so that instrumentalist trade policy increasingly subsumes traditional intellectual property norms. 57 Non-state actors, specifically private industry associations, worked in conjunction with state actors to facilitate TRIPS at the international level, and ultimately expand the global minimum standards of intellectual property -by now this is an oft-told tale. 58 Although global intellectual property has always been an exotic flavor of international economic law, the brute fact is that the WTO is a trade treaty rather than a specialized treaty dealing with "industrial property" or "literary and artistic works."
59 Thus we now have the unfamiliar phenomenon of trade economists weighing in on the intellectual property relatedness of TRIPS and finding it lacking by economic welfare measures. 60 However, much of the discourse of international trade law or trade economics has not crossed over into the mainstream intellectual property space. 61 industrialized countries such as the U.S. 63 The constructive ambiguities 64 or normative elasticities 65 inherent in both soft and hard law play important roles in these creative approaches to norm-setting and interpretation within the international intellectual property regime complex. The flexibility of soft law in particular may contribute to greater expansion of the policy flexibilities within TRIPS. The vast majority of legal proposals, however, respond to the WTO DSB's current preference for textual arguments and hard-law approaches over policy-based and soft-law norms. 66 Still, even within the international framework, the basic goals safeguarded by a robust public domain -such as encouraging user-based innovation, facilitating scientific research, education and scholarship, and supporting access to less expensive knowledge goods whenever consistent with the reasonable protection of intellectual property -are an essential aspect of the policy balance within intellectual property governance. Non-state actors and non-lawyers inserted through "nodes" have suggested non-intellectual property norms -and increased the normative landscape. These nodal governance networks will be discussed in more detail in the next Part.
Similarly, public-health norms, whether linked to human rights (the right to health), referenced through TRIPS Article 8, or standing alone, have impacted intellectual property through trade linkage. 73 The spirited public debate that gave rise to the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health 74 and its progeny illustrates the unexpected consequences of linkage bargaining with respect to plural norms as they infiltrate and affect intellectual property. 75 Norm entrepreneurs advocating for public health and other trade linkages to global intellectual property have pushed for supranational-and national-level norms that would tilt the global prices so as to favor access to patented pharmaceuticals through compulsory licensing provisions. 76 Non-state actors continually collaborate with states to advocate for an understanding of intellectual property's mandate that includes promotion of health as a goal. 77 The dialectical interactions of plural norms are illustrated by the knitting together of the domains of health and human rights to trade and intellectual property. This public health-intellectual property hybridization has also highlighted the significance of soft law. Numerous analyses about the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health and the subsequent 2003 General Council decision 78 have articulated their relationship vis-a`-vis previous "hard law" decisions of the WTO. The compulsory licenses themselves are a type of hybrid private/public soft-law mechanism for encouraging the production of certain global public goods.
II. CONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE
The WIPO Development Agenda (WIPO DA), now in the process of being implemented through its Committee on Development and Intellectual Property (WIPO CDIP), is a prime terrain with which to explore the multiple and multidirectional interactions of global governance norms. Developing country member states partnered with public interest non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to suggest new norms for intellectual property and development through the vehicle of the WIPO DA. 79 The WIPO General Assembly then adopted forty-five DA recommendations and subsequently established the WIPO CDIP. The General Assembly's endorsement of these soft law recommendations and a committee within WIPO to integrate development with intellectual property seem to signal a formal commitment to a more pluralistic approach to norm-setting and technical assistance. 80 Yet, unlike some other intergovernmental IGOs, WIPO's core institutional identity is not as a development agency. While the development mandate currently being pursued by the WIPO CDIP has given rise to some specific activities, including a WIPO work program within the domain of intellectual property, 81 it is still relatively unaffected by development domains outside of intellectual property. It is not clear from the recommendations how intellectual property's mandates of promoting the production of knowledge will intersect with the production of other global public goods such as increased public education or health. Moreover, while these recommendations reflect certain beneficial characteristics such as malleability, 82 reason for linking intellectual property to the trade framework was precisely to harden the global intellectual property governance regime. 85 The vaunted dynamism and flexibility of soft law -characterized by a lack of formal sanctioning mechanisms, a tolerance of space between current reality and future ideal, a realistic assumption of differing national capacities to attain global policy goals, an ability to move forward concertedly in the face of disagreement among key decision-making authorities or political weakness, and lack of explicit coercion that might be interpreted as oppressive by weaker states 86 -are particularly intriguing in the context of this new initiative then. Within dominant global governance frameworks, human development and human rights have historically appeared to be orthogonal or parallel endeavors, rather than part of the same field as intellectual property. 87 Among the forty-five recommendations adopted by the WIPO General Assembly, however, are nineteen items immediately implemented due to lack of financial or human resource constraints, including:
CLUSTER B: Norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and public domain 15. Norm-setting activities shall: be inclusive and member driven; take into account different levels of development; take into consideration a balance between costs and benefits; be a participatory process, which takes into consideration the interests and priorities of all WIPO Member States and the viewpoints of other stakeholders, including accredited inter-governmental organizations and non-governmental organizations; and be in line with the principle of neutrality of the WIPO Secretariat. 16 . Consider the preservation of the public domain within WIPO's normative processes and deepen the analysis of the implications and benefits of a rich and accessible public domain. 17 . In its activities, including norm-setting, WIPO should take into account the flexibilities in international intellectual property agreements, especially those which are of interest to developing countries and LDCs. 85 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 16, at 1204. 86 Lobel, supra note 3, at 393-94. Some proposals were prepared by developed countries after several initial proposals were tabled during sometimes contentious debate. 87 89 Id. In addition, the WIPO Secretariat has proposed a "thematic project" approach to these recommendations for increased efficiency. And the WIPO CDIP's mandate includes: to (i) develop a work-program for implementation of the adopted recommendations;
(ii) monitor, assess, discuss and report on the implementation of all recommendations adopted, and for that purpose it shall coordinate with relevant WIPO bodies; (iii) discuss intellectual property and development related issues as agreed by the Committee, as well as those decided by the General Assembly.
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Given the WIPO CDIP's charge, it may be productive to return to the initial question posed at the beginning of this Article: What exactly is meant by "development" within this new hybrid realm of intellectual property? While the DA was not the first concerted effort by developing country member-states to effect structural change within the global intellectual property regime, 91 it is the most recent and most obvious example. Indeed, in this area, more than in the environmental or human rights areas where they may be viewed as critics or adversaries, 92 NGOs have worked effectively with developing countries and industry associations to advance specific norms and proposals. 93 Thus the goal of "development" within intellectual property provides an opportunity to approach norm-setting and norm interpretation within intellectual property from a relatively non-state-centric perspective, consistent with the newer governance paradigm.
The nonbinding and non-enforceable aspect of the WIPO recommendations is also consistent with newer directions in intellectual property lawmaking, marked by less emphasis on treaty law or positive law reform, increasingly difficult to obtain in the multilateral context. All countries are more savvy about their short-term interests, if not the longer-term trajectories. The collective interests of developing countries or industrialized countries may not align with those of others within the same blocs. However, when "development" is invoked, it is often used to signify very different approaches to intellectual property. Development is an extremely malleable term and 90 Id. at these WIPO recommendations are among the softest forms of law. 94 As such, under what circumstances can and will these recommendations "harden" into institutional practices or even national or international public laws? Might this occur under arguably coercive conditions, as has arguably happened with WIPO's trademark recommendations? 95 What is the distance between law "in action" and law "on the books," as mediated by WIPO or other IGOs? As norms are interpreted and even implemented, what are the checks and balances to make sure that they are intact not only within WIPO, but at the national level as well? 96 Of course, achieving consensus on these forty-five recommendations would clearly bring numerous benefits. Chief among them is the avoidance of having to reach consensus on a multilateral "hard law" instrument clearly outlining the specific relationship of intellectual property to development. But there are also some possible risks to a soft law "add-on" to the WIPO treaty mandates. Some developing countries may lack the capacity to follow up on these recommendations and/or may be utterly dependent on WIPO or developed countries for technical assistance of a particular kind. As with other IGOs or powerful NGOs, there may be a strong tendency to defer to expertise, although some emerging economies, such as Brazil or India, may be able to counteract that tendency by playing leadership roles within the developing country bloc, in a counter-harmonization modality. 97 Early evidence suggests that a subset of member states -specifically transitional economies -are taking a leading role in the implementation of the Development Agenda, rather than the full spectrum of industrialized countries, developing countries and least-developed countries. . 97 Reichman, supra note 43, at 112. 98 101 Of these three sets of recommendations, the Recommendations on Well-Known Marks have garnered the most commentary and controversy. The U.S. has entered into a number of bilateral agreements requiring both parties to adhere to the standards within the recommendations. 102 Because it was independent of consumer confusion, the provision regarding dilution within the recommendations was controversial enough that several of the members of the SCT refused to join this particular recommendation. 103 This experience has partly led Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss to recommend that in evaluating the normative persuasiveness of a WIPO document subject to elevation to possible hard-law status, it first be subject to assessment along criteria such as "degree of transparency accorded to interested parties (including civil society); the diversity of the input; the extent to which state delegations participated; how states, commentators, and practitioners reacted to the instrument; and how many WIPO members formally adopted the conclusions (and under what circumstances) ." 104 Assessed against the Dinwoodie/Dreyfuss criteria, the WIPO DA recommendations should be normatively persuasive. The entire WIPO General Assembly endorsed these recommendations in September 2007 after numerous public meetings involving robust debates among member states and civil society organizations. Indeed, these recommendations are considered a core aspect of a pro-development global intellectual property framework, which should be "mainstreamed" throughout WIPO, according to Francis Gurry, the organization's Director General. 105 Gurry has also stated to the CDIP that the "development dimension must be taken into account horizontally across [WIPO] . . . [and] that the appropriate budgetary resources would be made available to support the implementation of proposals contained in the Development Agenda."
106 Whether and how they will be further mainstreamed into a global governance framework through hard law instruments, as is occurring with the joint recommendation on well-known marks is, however, an open question.
One early example of the normative flux around the interpretation and implementation of the WIPO DA recommendations is illustrative. The CDIP Working Document includes numerous references to "flexibilities." In reference to recommendation 17 in Cluster B, the WIPO Secretariat states:
Flexibilities regarding the scope and exercise of copyright and related rights vary from one country to another. Being based on the particular social or economic needs of each country, the diversity of exceptions to copyright has been permitted, and even promoted at Notably, in the CDIP's Second Session, held in July 2008, a vigorous debate took place over the precise meaning and scope of the term "flexibilities" in connection with recommendation 12 ("To further mainstream development considerations into WIPO's substantive and technical assistance activities and debates, in accordance with its mandate."). The WIPO Secretariat has documented that it is implementing this recommendation in part through " [l] egislative assistance on the use of flexibilities to implement . . . specific public policies designated by Member States, such as access to pharmaceutical products, promotion of a competitive environment, encouragement of small, incremental inventions, etc." 108 In the CDIP discussion of this part of WIPO's activities and work program, the U.S. delegation stated that " [d] iscussing flexibilities without the context of rights and obligations has all the rhythm of one hand clapping," while the Indian delegation stated that "[t]he focus should be on flexibilities, and not have it include rights and obligations. We want to build awareness on flexibilities, and [we] understand that the background is of rights."
109 Similar skirmishes took place over the concept of the "public domain" and its relationship to traditional knowledge, in connection with recommendation 20. 110 Thus intellectual property's role in global development, which was the subject of vigorous disagreements during the early DA meetings, continues to be debated within the CDIP as it is implemented from a soft law base to (possibly) something harder.
Among other things, successful human development focuses on primary levels of education, 111 encourages creative models of educational access, 112 and nurtures innovation capacity through educational preparedness, including teacher-student training through systems of knowledge transmission. 113 An interesting question is how the WIPO DA recommendations, as interpreted and implemented by the CDIP, will interface with longstanding hard-law norms such as those in the Berne Convention. The WIPO CDIP should address a multilateral translation exception to digital rights, in order to address this 108 114 Finally, the WTO and WIPO could coordinate stakeholders around specific amendments to TRIPS to focus on specific human capabilities aspects of IP, including minimum exceptions and limitations for education -a hardening of soft-law norms. 115 Along these lines, some countries have adopted a fair use-style provision similar to that of the U.S. and it would be an important project in the future to trace how this is being used to further educational access.
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III. (DE)CONSTRUCTING DEVELOPMENT THROUGH GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GOVERNANCE
The benefits of global governance include the possibility of a more democratic, flexible, grassroots and nimble governance structure. The risks are that the rise of non-state actors to the forefront of narratives of legal reform, heralded by some as a harmonious orchestration of civil society with markets and government, is also consistent with a world in which the private sector problematically replace state-based efforts to address inequality. Accompanying this risk is that soft law could lack due process of law.
Scholars have documented processes by which intellectual property hard law can be effected by stealth, either through extremely soft lead-up mechanisms such as public reports, diplomatic speeches and/or unofficial comments 117 or through "policy laundering" strategies of negotiating for terms in international treaties as end-runs around difficult domestic debates. 118 Arguably, soft law can be an even more suitable vehicle for such policy laundering mechanisms than ambiguous treaty law provisions. In some forms, it can provide the appearance of consensus, inclusiveness, notice and transparency without the accompanying reality of these critical components of due process and public debate that should accompany robust forms of public law-making. 119 This is not to say that the WIPO Development Agenda recommendations can be criticized on these grounds, but only that all significant soft law initiatives should be assessed for these possible risks.
Overall, the forty-five recommendations of the WIPO DA could be characterized as representing the political compromise that was necessary for consensus among WIPO states that vary widely in their levels of development. They reinforce the central idea that innovation per se is the primary goal and value of intellectual property (with the correlative commitments to a robust public domain as a stimulus to innovation, and to knowledge as an input to further knowledge). Intellectual property first principles such as attention to the public domain were advocated by norm entrepreneurs during the three years of discussions of the WIPO DA, and are now being scrutinized through the aegis of the WIPO CDIP as well as WIPO's Standing Committee on Copyright and Related Rights (SCCR).
Prior to the adoption of the forty-five WIPO CDIP recommendations, WIPO's primary development approach arguably emphasized the strengthening of intellectual property legal infrastructure, offices, capacity building, and human resources to better enhance the promotion of intellectual property and economic growth. 120 121 reinforces this view of development as being directed towards an improved understanding of intellectual property and greater participation in the global intellectual property system. WIPO's development efforts prior to the Development Agenda debate were development-friendly, but within a particular model of development, emphasizing economic growth. This model cannot, however, tell the whole story of development, at least not in terms of intellectual property, because it deemphasizes the important variable of an appropriate educational and scientific infrastructure, as well as local knowledge, in generating the kind of innovation and growth led by intellectual property. 122 This is not to discount the importance of economic growth, but to emphasize that multiple development models are optimal. Explicit consideration of social and environmental facets of development is arguably more consistent with global frameworks, as explained in earlier Sections. Thus the three years of open debate within the WIPO multilateral IGO structure, giving rise to the soft law recommendations now being implemented by the WIPO CDIP, is somewhat more structured and arguably more inclusive of public interest concerns than a pure "peer-production" or market-based model of governance.
As I have written elsewhere, swinging from public to private ordering has wrought some victories for unrepresented or vulnerable populations, but private decentralized approaches may be too scattershot to address systematic global inequities. 123 As Elkin-Koren's contribution in this volume suggests, for example, terms of service in Facebook may not contain clear access rules for follow-on innovators and users. 124 Indeed, it is banal to observe that the public law aspects of copyright are an increasingly smaller piece of the regulatory puzzle with respect to copyright-protected knowledge goods. Yet it is an open question whether states can or will step decisively into an increasingly privatized regulatory environment to effectuate through public law a social welfare balance between the content owners, technology innovators, consumers/users and other stakeholders. Hope, Nicol and Braithwaite have argued optimistically that "[o]pen-source style . . . patent licences and material transfer agreements represent just one of a range of devices that might be used to flip markets in vice to markets in virtue in the context of biotechnology."
125 But it is not clear whether such private law interventions -even if widely adopted -can ameliorate the more inflexible and structurally embedded aspects of public law frameworks.
And of course, there is an inherent indeterminacy in defining the public interest. 126 The term "public" in "public interest" or "public domain" or "public good" is not a trump card in favor of development norms; at the end of the day, these terms are socially constructed. This observation dovetails with the longstanding concern that the public/private division must be critically rethought in what has become a heavily propertized or privatized global neoliberal framework. 127 As Brett Frischmann has argued, rather than thinking about the fundamental intellectual property policy balance as between exclusive rights and access, we may want to reconceptualize it as allocations between private and public rights in knowledge goods, or the allocation of externalities. 128 This conceptual conundrum is further complicated through what has been described as "cross-cutting" relationships between and among intergovernmental agencies, both domestically and globally. On the multilateral front, in addition to the WTO and WIPO (which became 125 Hope et al., supra note 3, at 113-14. 126 134 Nonetheless, these other organizations are still ancillary to the intellectual property norm-setting regime, which is currently dominated by the WTO and WIPO. The crosscutting aspect of governance emphasizes the multi-directionality of normative flows among public law-making nodes, including ones that may be more sympathetic to the non-innovation goals of development.
At the same time, a somewhat more capacious approach to intellectual property norm-setting is evident throughout the WIPO DA recommendations. According to one recommendation, for example, WIPO is to consider the viewpoints of a variety of norm entrepreneurs -including accredited public IGOs and NGOs. The detailed initial working document of the CDIP suggests that the "WIPO [already] acts as a facilitator helping to maintain an ongoing dialogue between all stakeholders." 135 A sanguine view is that developing countries are increasingly taking the lead as demandeurs and norm entrepreneurs outside of the WIPO CDIP, both nationally and internationally. 136 According to Benvenisti and Downes, who are critical of regime fragmentation generally, this can lead to the ability of developing democratic states to engage in "soft balancing . . . [which is] designed to produce a gradual shift in practices and eventually outcomes that will benefit weaker states in the long run." 137 As Benvenisti and Downes have also written, however, pluralism or regime fragmentation creates these ever-multiplying venues, and thus can prevent consensus among diffuse interests, allowing the powerful member-states to exit to other venues, and mask the asymmetric nature of power within the overall global governance structure. 138 Less resourced member-states may then have difficulty simply showing up at these fora in which development and intellectual property norms are being debated and implemented. Whether these alternatives touted within global governance theory will offset the other structural tendencies and ultimately aid and abet the less powerful or more powerful member-states is still an open question. For example, a self-selected group of major industrialized states has been discussing a plurilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (hereinafter ACTA) since 2007 . 139 This ad hoc plurilateral forum represents a newer governance actor attempting to reinforce the exclusive rights perspectives and enforcement aspects of global intellectual property rights holders. It has done so in a way that is less than transparent and inclusive, for example, by not releasing public versions of its negotiated text until April 2010, and by not involving states that would be likely to raise objections to the provisions under negotiation. This raises troubling questions with regard to accountability and other process issues under a global governance framework, including the spectre of policy laundering. 140 WIPO continues to need to demonstrate its legitimacy and relevance as a multilateral institution committed to development, and it can do this in conjunction with the WTO. For example, the WIPO CDIP could recommend that norms generated pursuant to the recommendations in Cluster B then fall presumptively within the three-step test of TRIPS Article 13. 141 Another possibility is to borrow some of the global governance criteria developed by Keohane (in the different context of fragmented governance regimes with respect to climate change), and apply them to soft-law norm setting, interpretation and implementation in intellectual property. 142 As Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss have suggested, there may be a way to link TRIPS Article 67 143 to the WIPO CDIP Work Program. 144 Soft law is not only for possible end-runs around public policy debates but also for nuanced and localized approaches critical to development. As Tamanaha has written about law and development:
"Context matters," "local conditions are crucial," "circumstances on the ground shape how things work," -variations of this insight [have] been repeated so often it is nearly a cliché. What stymies law and development projects time and again is the "extreme interrelatedness of everything with everything else in a society." For sake of convenience, I will call this the "connectedness of law principle."
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CONCLUSION
I have attempted to nuance a little further our understandings of global intellectual property governance, a project still very much under construction. The focus here is on nontraditional actors working in partnership with states, and on softer forms of law being implemented within a multilateral intergovernmental organizational framework. Ultimately, what kinds of norms with respect to development are likely to be articulated more persuasively and powerfully by these various mechanisms? 146 It is surely not possible now (if it ever was) to compartmentalize intellectual property from the cultural, political, social as well as technological dimensions of what economists call public goods. Demands are now being made upon intellectual property to respond to human development goals such as education and health -that is, a whole plethora of global public goods aside from creativity and innovation per se, which has been the recent primary focus of intellectual property. In tandem with the production of these other global public goods, a greater focus on governance technologies other than positive law and on governance agents other than states can point to dynamic and innovative methods to re-invent intellectual property -itself a technology of regulation (or even arguably a public good) for dynamic innovation. In this Article, I have tried to elaborate upon newer actors as well as forms and directions of law without either over-romanticizing them or minimizing their risks.
